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1.

Introduction
International research on analysts suggests that investor protection affects analyst

coverage and forecast accuracy across countries. Chang, Khanna, and Palepu (2000) find
that analyst coverage is lower for common law countries than for civil law countries,
implying that analyst coverage would play a more important role in countries with weak
investor protection than in countries with strong investor protection. However, they also
find that analyst forecasts are less accurate for civil law countries although more analysts
follow firms in those countries. Similarly, Hope (2003) documents that analyst forecasts
are more accurate for countries with high quality accounting disclosure quality and
enforcement of accounting standards, suggesting that analysts perform better for
countries with strong investor protection.
Recently, Yu (2008) and Knyazeva (2007) add to the literature by investigating the
association between analyst coverage and earnings management. They find that high
analyst coverage is associated with less earnings management in U.S., suggesting that
analyst coverage can play a governance role in capital markets. However, the research on
analysts’ governance role is limited, especially in the international context. An exception
is a study by Lang, Lins, and Miller (2004) who find that the association between firm
valuation and the interaction of analyst coverage and concentrated family / management
control is more positive for countries with weak investor protection. Their findings
suggest that the governance role of analyst coverage could be magnified while investor
protection is weak. Since extant research on the governance role of international analysts
is limited, it is warranted to conduct more research on it.
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Analyst coverage could be a substitute to other corporate governance mechanisms
(Knyazeva 2007). In countries with weak investor protection, firms have more agency
problems and weak corporate governance. As a substitute, analyst coverage may play a
more important governance role in those countries. On the other hand, the governance
role of analyst coverage could be attenuated by weak investor protection, resulting in less
effectiveness of analyst coverage for weak investor protection countries. Thus, whether
the governance role of analyst coverage is more important in weak investor protection
countries than in strong investor protection countries is an empirical question.
This study examines whether analyst coverage is more effective in constraining
earnings management for countries with weak investor protection than for countries with
strong investor protection. Using a sample of 47,999 firm-year observations over the
period 1990 to 2007 from 23 countries, I find that earnings management is more
negatively associated with analyst coverage when countries’ investor protection is weak.
The results are robust to several additional analyses. My findings suggest that analyst
coverage plays a more important role in countries with weak investor protection, i.e.,
there is a substitution relation between analyst coverage and investor protection.
This study contributes to the literature in the following two ways. First, I extend
the limited research on the governance role of analysts. Unlike Yu (2008) and Knyazeva
(2007), my study focuses on international data and the effect of investor protection on
analysts’ governance role. By examining the association between analyst coverage and
earnings management in the international context, this study provides more explicit
evidence on the substitution relation between analyst coverage and investor protection to
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expand the study by Lang et al. (2004). Second, this study adds to a growing literature on
international analysts. Prior research (e.g., Chang, et al. 2000; Hope 2003) focuses on
investigating the effect of country-level institutions on analyst coverage and forecast
accuracy. This study extends those studies by examining the effect of investor protection
on the effectiveness of analyst coverage in constraining earnings management.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces background
and develops the hypothesis. Second 3 discusses research design. Section 4 presents
empirical results. Section 5 concludes.

2.

Background and Hypothesis

2.1

International analyst research
There is a growing literature that investigates the role of analysts in international

capital markets. Chang et al. (2000) investigate analyst activity and performance in 47
countries around the world. They first examines whether country-level variables
including average firm size, capital market development, legal origin, ownership
concentration, foreign investment, and accounting disclosure quality are associated with
analyst coverage. They find that analyst coverage is higher for countries with high
average firm size, well developed stock market, or high accounting disclosure quality,
and is lower for common law countries. They also examine whether the country-level
variables affect forecast error and forecast dispersion. They find that analyst forecasts are
more accurate for common law countries or countries with high accounting disclosure
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quality or low stock return variability. Moreover, they find that forecast dispersion is
lower for common law countries or countries with low stock return variability.
Ang and Ciccone (2001) also examine the international differences in analyst
forecast properties among 42 countries. They investigate the effect of country-level
variables including legal environment, banking system, family system, and accounting
disclosure quality on forecast error and forecast dispersion.1 Using multivariate
regression analysis, they only find that accounting disclosure quality is negatively
associated with forecast error, and family system dummy is positively associated with
forecast dispersion. Again, Hope (2003) examines the association between analyst
forecast accuracy and country-level variables including accounting disclosure quality and
enforcement of accounting standards in 22 countries. He documents evidence that
analyst forecast accuracy is positively associated with both accounting disclosure quality
and the level of enforcement of accounting standards.
Lang et al. (2004) investigate the relation among ownership structure, analyst
following, investor protection, and valuation in 27 countries. They first examine whether
analyst coverage is associated with the presence of concentrated family / management
control. They find that analysts are less likely to follow firms when the family /
management group is the largest control rights blockholder. Moreover, they find that the
negative association between analyst coverage and the presence of concentrated family /
management control is stronger in countries with weak investor protection. This suggests

1

Legal environment is measured as a scale from 0-6 based on the ability of the legal system to
resolve disputes. Bank system is coded “1” if a country has a bank-dominated system and “0” otherwise.
Family system is coded “1” if a country has a family dominated system and “0” otherwise.
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that analysts are less likely to follow firms with more corporate governance issues when
countries’ investor protection is weak. On the other hand, they examine the interaction
effects of concentrated family / management control and analyst coverage on firm
valuation. They find that the interaction of concentrated family / management control
and analyst coverage is more positively associated with firm valuation for firms in
countries with low investor protection, suggesting that analysts play a more important
governance role in those countries.
Barniv, Myring, and Thomas (2005) examine whether legal origin affects the
ability of analyst characteristics to explain relative forecast accuracy. They argue that
market forces provide incentives to analysts for performing better in common law
countries than in civil law countries. Using a sample of firms in 12 common-law
countries and 21 civil-law countries, they find that analysts with superior ability in
common-law countries outperform their peers, whereas analysts with superior ability in
civil-law countries less consistently outperform their peers. Bushman, Piotroski, and
Smith (2005) investigate the relation between insider trading restrictions and analyst
following. Using data for 100 countries, they find that analyst following increases after
initial enforcement of insider trading laws more greatly for countries emerging market
countries and countries without a preexisting portfolio of strong investor protections.
More recently, Bae, Tan, and Welker (2008) investigate the effect of GAAP differences
on foreign analyst following and forecast accuracy. Based on the data from 49 countries,
they document that GAAP difference between two countries is negatively associated with
foreign analyst following and forecast accuracy.
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In summary, prior research focuses on examining the effect of country-level
variables on analyst following and forecast performance. There is limited research on
investigating the governance role of analyst coverage across countries.

2.2

Governance role of analysts
Prior research suggests that analysts play an information intermediary role in the

capital market (e.g., Healy and Palepu 2001). For example, Barth, Kasznik, and,
McNichols (2001) find that more analysts follow high intangible firms than low
intangible firms, suggesting that analysts augment the financial reporting systems for
intangibles. Barron, Byard, Kile, Riedl, and Demers (2002) document a negative
association between a firm’s level of intangible assets and the consensus in analysts’
earnings forecasts. Their findings suggest that analysts rely more on their own private
information search when issuing earnings forecasts for high intangible firms and
thereafter supplement those firms’ financial information. Gu and Chen (2004) find that
analysts selectively include more persistent nonrecurring items and nonrecurring items
with high valuation multiples in street earnings. This suggests that analysts can interpret
financial information and enhance its usefulness.
Analysts also serve the monitoring role through interpreting public information
and searching for private information. Analysts’ great experience on tracking corporate
financial statements and substantial industry-wide knowledge facilitate them to
effectively monitor firms’ financial reporting. Managers are less likely to issue
fraudulent financial reports when analysts can see through them. Since analysts’
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performance affects their reputations and compensation, they have incentives to search
for private information and scrutinize firms’ public disclosure in order to achieve their
better performance. Dyck, Morse, and Zingales (2006) find that analysts are more
effective in detecting corporate frauds than the Securities and Exchange Commission and
auditors. Thus, analyst coverage is an important and alternative governance mechanism.
Recently, the governance role of analyst coverage has been emphasized by two
studies. Yu (2008) examines whether analyst coverage can constrain earnings
management. He finds that a high level of analyst coverage is associated with a low level
of discretionary accruals. He also finds that high analyst coverage leads to less earnings
management measured by the discontinuity of earnings distribution around earnings
benchmarks. Knyazeva (2007) investigates the effect of analyst coverage on firm
behavior. She argues that analyst coverage acts as a magnifying lens of managerial
opportunism, allowing less informed shareholders to impose discipline on value
destroying managers. She also finds that the level of earnings management is lower for
firms with high analyst coverage than for firms with low analyst coverage. Their results
suggest that analyst coverage plays an important governance role in constraining earnings
management.

2.3

Hypothesis
As investors face a risk of expropriating their wealth by controlling shareholders

or managers, they need to be protected by law and its enforcement. Countries with weak
investor protection have low anti-director rights and legal enforcement (La Porta, Lopez-
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de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1998). Anti-director rights reflect the extent to which
the legal system favors minority shareholders against managers or dominant shareholders
in the corporate decision-making process, including the voting process. Thus, low antidirector rights will lead to more agency problems related to managerial opportunism and
the expropriation of minority shareholders. Durnev and Kim (2005) note that countries
with strong investor protection laws may be ineffective if they are not enforced. Antidirector rights are a de jure measure of investor protection that cannot measure the de
facto strength of investor protection. As a de facto measure of investor protection, legal
enforcement reflects how strongly the legal system is enforced to protect investors
against the expropriation by managers and controlling shareholders. Thus, weak legal
enforcement will lead to more managers’ and controlling shareholders’ opportunistic
behavior.
While there are more agency problems for firms in countries with weak investor
protection, corporate governance is also weak for those firms. La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) find that strong investor protection is associated with
valuable capital markets, and then argue that strong investor protection creates an
environment that fosters good corporate governance. DeFond and Hung (2004) examine
whether investor protection affects the association between CEO turnover and poor
performance, which reflects the quality of corporate governance because good corporate
governance will terminate poorly performing CEOs. They document that strong legal
enforcement significantly improves the association between CEO turnover and poor
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performance. Their results suggest that weak investor protection could lead to a low
quality of corporate governance.
Recent studies by Yu (2008) and Knyazeva (2007) suggest that analyst coverage
plays a corporate governance role. Knyazeva (2007) also examines whether analyst
coverage is a substitute or complement to other corporate governance mechanisms. She
finds that the earnings management is more negatively associated with analyst coverage
for firms with low institutional ownership than for firms with high institutional
ownership. As institutional shareholding is a kind of corporate governance mechanism
(Bushee 1998), Knyazeva’s (2007) findings suggest that analyst coverage could be a
substitute to other corporate governance mechanisms. Since firms in countries with weak
investor protection have more agency problems and lower corporate governance quality,
it is likely that analyst coverage will play a more important role in mitigating agency
problems and substituting other low quality governance mechanisms in those countries.
However, as analyst coverage itself is a kind of governance mechanism, the effectiveness
of its governance role could be lower in weak investor protection countries. Thus,
whether analyst coverage plays a more important governance role in weak investor
protection countries than in strong investor protection countries is an empirical question.
We develop the hypothesis as follows:
H1

The association between analyst coverage and earnings management is moderated
by investor protection.
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3.

Research Design

3.1

Data and variables
I first collect the data of analyst coverage for both U.S. and international firms

from the I/B/E/S Detail History database. Analyst coverage is computed as the total
number of analysts who issue forecasts of the next fiscal year’s earnings per share for a
firm during the current fiscal year. Next, I collect the data from COMPUSTAT Global to
calculate other firm-level variables used in the analysis. Since I/B/E/S provides CUSIPs
only for U.S. and Canadian companies, I have to manually match non-U.S. and nonCanadian companies between I/B/E/S and COMPUSTAT Global based on company
names in the two databases.2 This procedure identifies non-U.S. and non-Canadian firms
that have both I/B/E/S TICKER and COMPUSTAT GVKEY. Then, I merge the I/B/E/S
dataset with the COMPUSTAT Global dataset using CUSIPs for U.S. and Canadian
firms, and TICKERs matched with GVKEYs for other countries’ firms.
Following Leuz, Nanda, Wysocki (2003), I measure earnings management by the
ratio of the absolute value of accruals and the absolute value of cash flow from
operations.3 Leuz et al. (2003) assert that the magnitude of accruals reflects the extent to
which insiders exercise discretion in reporting earnings. In addition, I do not use the
Jones model to determine discretionary accruals because of general concerns about the
Jones model’s ability to separate discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals (e.g.,
2

For non-U.S. and non-Canadian companies, CUSIPs in I/B/E/S are SEDOL codes, which are not
provided in COMPUSTAT Global.
3
Leuz, Nanda, Wysocki (2003) also use other three measures of earnings management including:
the ratio of the standard deviation of operating income and operating cash flow, the Spearman correlation
between the change in accruals and the change in cash flow from operations, and the number of “small
profits” divided by the number of “small losses”. However, these three variables are not measured for each
firm-year observation and thus cannot be used in this study’s cross-section analysis.
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Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995) and because I am not aware of any evidence that
indicates that the Jones model performs equally well across countries. Since it is still
likely that accruals are a noisy proxy for earnings management, I also use an earnings
benchmark variable as an alternative proxy for earnings management in robustness tests
(discussed later).
Like Leuz et al. (2003) and Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2004), total
accruals are measured as: change in current assets – change in current liabilities – change
in cash + change in short-term debt – depreciation. Cash flow from operations is net
income less total accruals. I also use four firm-level variables in the analysis. They
include the market-to-book ratio (MB), firm size (SIZE), financial leverage (LEV), and
loss-making dummy (LOSS). The market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of
common equity to the book value of common equity. Firm size is measured as the
logarithm value of total assets. Financial leverage is long-term debt divided by total
assets. Loss-making dummy is 1 if a firm is making loss and 0 otherwise.
Following DeFond and Hung (2004), I use the country-level measure of legal
enforcement as a main proxy for investor protection. I use legal enforcement because
Durnev and Kim (2005) note that a country can have strong investor protection laws in
place, but these can be ineffective if they are not enforced. For example, India and
Pakistan have strong investor protection laws but the de facto strength of investor
protection is weak in these two countries (Durnev and Kim 2005). Like Leuz et al.
(2003), legal enforcement scores are computed as the average of three measures from La
Porta et al. (1998): (1) the efficiency of the judicial system, (2) the rule of law, and (3)
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level of corruption in a country. In robustness tests, I also use anti-director rights, legal
origin, and institutional cluster as other proxies for investor protection.
Similar to Tucker and Zarowin (2006), I use the fractional ranking of the firmlevel continuous variables within each country-industry-year (two-digit SIC) in order to
control for the fixed country, industry and year effects. To mitigate the effect of few
observations within a country-industry-year on the fractional ranking, firm-year
observations in the sample are required to be within a country-industry-year from which
there are at least five observations.
I use the version of COMPUSTAT Global database updated on April 30, 2008 to
collect the data for years 1989 to 2007.4 Financial statement data is collected from the
COMPUSTAT Global Industrial /Commercial file and stock market data is collected
from COMPUSTAT Global Issue file. Since the lagged data is used in computing some
variables, the test period becomes years 1990 to 2007. After excluding observations
without the data of the firm-level variables and country-level investor protection, the final
sample consists of 47,999 firm-year observations for years 1990 to 2007.
Table 1 presents the sample breakdown by country. 47,999 firm-year observations
in the sample come from 23 countries. The numbers of observations from the U.S.
(24,942 observations or 51.96% of the sample), Japan (9,995 observations or 20.82% of
the sample), the U.K. (5,155 observations or 10.74% of the sample), and Canada (4,482
observations or 9.34% of the sample) are dominated in the sample. Because of the

4

1989 is the first year in this version of COMPUSTAT Global.
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dominance of these countries’ observations, in robustness tests, I test the hypothesis with
observations from these countries are omitted, respectively.
Insert Table 1
Table 2 summarizes the scores of investor protection across the 23 countries in the
sample. A high score for investor protection indicates a high investor protection in a
country. Four countries including Switzerland, Denmark, Netherlands, and Sweden have
the maximum score of legal enforcement among the sample countries, while Indonesia
has the minimum score.
Insert Table 2
3.2

Model
To test the hypothesis, I estimate the following model:
EM = b0 + b1INVP + b2ANALYST + b3INVP * ANALYST + b4MB + b5SIZE
+ b6 LEV + b7LOSS + ε

(1)

where
EM = Earnings management, measured as the fractional ranking of the ratio of
the absolute value of accruals to the absolute value of cash flow from
operations within a country-industry-year,
INVP = Investor protection, measured as the score of legal enforcement for a
country,
ANALYST = Analyst coverage, measured as the fractional ranking of the total number
of analysts who issue forecasts of the next fiscal year’s earnings per share
within a country-industry-year,
MB = Market-to-book ratio, measured as the fractional ranking of the ratio of the
market value of common equity to the book value of common equity
within a country-industry-year,
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SIZE = Firm size, measured as the fractional ranking of the logarithm value of
total assets within a country-industry-year,
LEV = Financial leverage, measured as the fractional ranking of the ratio of longterm debt to total assets within a country-industry-year,
LOSS = Loss-making dummy, coded “1” if a firm is making loss and “0” otherwise.
In eq. (1), the coefficient on investor protection (b1) is expected to be negative
because Leuz et al. (2003) find that the level of earnings management is lower for firms
in countries with strong investor protection than for firms in countries with weak investor
protection. Since Knyazeva (2007) and Yu (2008) document that analyst coverage is
negatively associated with the level of earnings management in the U.S. context, I also
predict a negative coefficient on analyst coverage (b2). If the hypothesis is supported, we
expect that b3 is significant. If analyst coverage plays a more important role in
constraining earnings management for firms in countries with weak investor protection
than for firms in countries with strong investor protection, then the coefficient on the
interaction term between investor protection and analyst coverage (b3) will be positive
and significant. On the other hand, b3 will be negative if analyst coverage plays a less
important role in constraining earnings management for firms in countries with weak
investor protection than for firms in countries with strong investor protection,
I include the market-to-book ratio, firm size, financial leverage, and loss-making
dummy in eq. (1) as control variables for three reasons. First, these four firm
characteristics are likely to affect the level of earnings management. Using the U.S. data,
Klein (2002a) finds that the market-to-book ratio and financial leverage are significantly
positively associated with the absolute value of discretionary accruals. She also
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documents an insignificantly positive and negative association of loss-making dummy
and firm size with the absolute value of discretionary accruals.
Second, these four firm characteristics are likely to affect the demand for internal
governance mechanisms. In her another U.S. study, Klein (2002b) document that the
market-to-book ratio, firm size, and loss-making dummy is significantly negatively
associated with audit committee independence, while financial leverage is insignificantly
negatively associated with audit committee independence. Durnev and Kim (2005) find
that it is more likely that firms with good investment opportunities have great incentives
to practice good corporate governance in countries with weak legal enforcement than in
countries with strong legal enforcement, suggesting that the market-to-book ratio could
be negatively associated with earnings management in the international context.
Third, some of these control variables may also affect analyst coverage. Yu
(2008) documents a significant and positive association of analyst coverage with growth
rate of assets, firm size, and earnings performance. Based on the above discussions, in
eq. (1), the coefficients on both the market-to-book ratio and firm size are expected to
either positive or negative, while the coefficients on both financial leverage and lossmaking dummy are expected to be positive. I estimate eq. (1) on pooled cross-sectional,
time series data. In robustness tests, I separately estimate eq. (1) on yearly crosssectional data for the Fama-MacBeth test.

4.

Empirical Results
Table 3, panel A presents the descriptive statistics of variables. The mean and

median of earnings management measure (EM) are 1.190 and 0.578, respectively. The
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median EM (i.e., 0.578) of all observations in the sample is close to the mean and median
(i.e., 0.558 and 0.552, respectively) of 31 countries’ median EMs in Leuz et al. (2003).
The mean and median of analyst coverage (ANALYST) for the sample are 8.71 and 6.00,
respectively, compared to the mean and median of analyst coverage (i.e., 9.66 and 6.00,
respectively) for the U.S. sample in Yu (2008).
Table 3, panel B provides the Pearson correlations between independent variables.
The maximum absolute value among the correlation coefficients is 0.66 between analyst
coverage and firm size. Since the correlations between the independent variables are not
excessive, multicollinearity is unlikely to be a substantive issue.
Insert Table 3
Table 4 provides the results for testing the hypothesis. I find that the coefficient
on the interaction term of investor protection and analyst coverage is positive and
significant (t-statistic = 4.47), consistent with the hypothesis. This shows that analyst
coverage is more negatively associated with the level of earnings management for firms
in countries with weak investor protection than for firms in countries with strong investor
protection. These findings suggest the substitution relation between analyst coverage and
investor protection that analyst coverage plays a more important monitoring role in
countries with weak investor protection.
Consistent with Leuz et al. (2003), I find that the level of earnings management is
lower for firms in countries with strong investor protection than for firms with weak
investor protection (t-statistic = -6.89). Also, I find that the level of earning management
is lower for firms with high analyst coverage than for firms with low analyst coverage (t-
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statistic = -5.25), consistent with the U.S. evidence in Knyazeva (2007) and Yu (2008).
In addition, the level of earnings management is negatively associated with the marketto-book ratio (t-statistic = -29.54), suggesting that firms with good investment
opportunities may have great incentives to practice good corporate governance in the
international context (Durnev and Kim 2005). Firm size is positively associated with the
level of earnings management (t-statistic = 7.42), consistent with the notion that large
firms have more agency problems (Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja 2007). Like Klein
(2002a), I find that financial leverage is positively associated with the level of earnings
management (t-statistic = 30.77). Finally, I find that the absolute value of accruals is
higher for loss-making firms than for profit-making firms (t-statistic = 50.18).
Insert Table 4
To examine the robustness of the results, I conduct several additional analyses.
First, I control for the endogenous relationship between earnings management and analyst
coverage. The endogenous relationship may exist because analysts are more likely to
self-select firms with high earnings quality than firms with low earnings quality. To
address this concern, I run the two-stage regression. Similar to Yu (2008), I use local
market index dummy as an instrumental variable because it can capture the variations in
analyst coverage that are exogenous to earnings quality. I estimate the first stage model
as follows:
ANALYST = a0 + a1LMIND + a2 MB + a3SIZE +a4LEV +a5LOSS + ε

(2)

where LMIND is local market index dummy, coded “1” for a firm included in a local
market index and “0” otherwise. Then, I estimate the second stage regression model, i.e.,
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eq. (1), using the fractional ranking of the fitted value from eq. (2) within each countryindustry-year (ANALYST^) to replace ANALYST.
Insert Table 5
Table 5 reports the results on examining the substitution relation between analyst
coverage and investor protection after allowing for the endogeneity of analyst coverage.
I also find that the coefficient on the interaction of investor protection and analyst
coverage is positive and significant (t-statistic = 2.86). Thus, the results after considering
the endogeneity still support the notion that the level of earnings management is more
negatively associated with analyst coverage for firms in countries with weak investor
protection than for firms in countries with strong investor protection.
Second, I examine the sensitivity of the results to alternative proxies for investor
protection including: anti-director rights, legal origin, and institutional clusters. We use
anti-director rights because it measures the voting rights of minority shareholders (Leuz
et al. 2003). Legal origin is a dummy coded “1” for a common law country and “0” for a
civil law country as prior research suggests that investor protection is higher in common
law countries than civil law countries (La Porta et al. 1998). Leuz et al. (2003) classify
countries into three institutional clusters in terms of investor protection based on nine
institutional variables from La Prota et al. (1997; 1998).5 We code “2”, “1”, and “0” for a
country in Clusters 1, 2, and 3, respectively.

5

Nine institutional variables include stock market capitalization, listed firms, IPOs, ownership
concentration, anti-director rights, disclosure index, efficiency of judicial system, rule of law, and
corruption index.
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Table 6 presents the results for the alternative measures of investor protection.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 report that the level of earnings management is more
negatively associated with analyst coverage in countries with weak anti-director rights (tstatistic = 3.92). In columns 5 and 6 of Table 6, we provide the results that analyst
coverage constrains earnings management more greatly in civil law countries (t-statistic =
4.87). Columns 7 and 8 of Table 6 also present that the negative association between
earnings management and analyst coverage is stronger for countries with weak investor
protection measured by institutional clusters (t-statistic = 5.60). Thus, the results are
robust to those alternative measures of investor protection.
Insert Table 6
Third, I use the Fama-MacBeth test to control for the autocorrelations of timeseries data. I estimate eq. (1) using yearly data. The mean coefficient on the interaction
term of analyst coverage and investor protection for years 1991 to 2007 is 0.054.6 Based
on the seventeen years’ annual coefficients, I document that the non-tabulated FamaMacBeth t-statistic is 5.04, which is strongly significant (two-tailed p-value <0.001).
These results are consistent with the results of the pooled regression.
Fourth, I examine whether the results are driven by the dominance of the number
of some countries’ observations in the sample. I am concerned with this issue because an
extremely high proportion of the observations in the sample are from the U.S., Japan, the
U.K., and Canada. To deal with this issue, I estimate eq. (1) by excluding (1) U.S.
observations, (2) U.S. and Japanese observations, (3) U.S., Japanese, and U.K.
6

Since all observations for 1990 (i.e., 20 observations) are from the U. K., eq. (1) cannot be
estimated for that year.
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observations, and (4) U.S., Japanese, U.K., and Canadian observations, respectively. I
find that the coefficients on the interaction term of analyst coverage and investors are all
positive and significant (non-tabulated t-statistic = 4.15 when U.S. observations are
omitted, 4.65 when U.S. and Japanese observations are omitted, 5.27 when U.S.,
Japanese, and U.K. observations are omitted, and 3.39 when U.S., Japanese, U.K., and
Canadian observations are omitted). Thus, the results are not driven by the dominance of
those countries’ observations in the sample.
Fifth, I examine whether the results are robust to an alternative measure of
earnings management. Similar to Yu (2008), I use earnings benchmark dummy that takes
the value of “1” if the change in earnings scaled by the beginning total assets lies in the
interval of [0, 002) and “0” otherwise to measure earnings management because it is
found that firms with a smaller increase in earnings are more likely to engage in earnings
management (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). I run the logistical regression of eq. (1)
where the dependent variable is replaced with the earnings benchmark dummy.7
Insert Table 7
Table 7 reports the results on earning benchmark measure. I document that the
negative association between the likelihood of firms’ just meeting or beating prior year’s
earnings and analyst coverage is stronger for firms in countries with weak investor
protection (chi-square statistic = 2.92), suggesting the substitution relation between
analysts coverage and investor protection. Thus, the results still hold when I measure
earnings management in an alternative way.
7

Based on prior research (e.g., Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew 2003), the sign of the coefficient
on LOSS is expected to be negative.
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5.

Conclusion
This study examines whether investor protection affects the ability of analyst

coverage in constraining earnings management. I find that analyst coverage is more
negatively associated with earnings management for countries with weak investor
protection than for countries with strong investor protection. This suggests that the
governance role of analyst coverage is magnified by weak investor protection. This study
makes two contributions to the literature. First, this study adds to the limited research on
the governance role of analysts by focusing on international data and the effect of
investor protection on analysts’ governance role. Second, this study extends a growing
literature on international analysts by examining the effectiveness of analyst coverage in
constraining earnings management.
This study also has certain limitations as follows. First, many countries are
omitted from our final sample because sample firms need to be included by both
Compustat Global and I/B/E/S. Second, it is unclear whether the approach to control for
endogeneity of analyst coverage in this study is most appropriate although I follow Yu
(2008)’s approach. Third, it is also unclear which method to measure earnings
management is more appropriate in the international context.
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Table 1
Sample Breakdown by Country
Country Name
Australia
Brazil
Canada
Switzerland
Chile
Germany
Denmark
France
United Kingdom
Hong Kong
Indonesia
Japan
Korea
Mexico
Malaysia
Netherlands
Philippines
Singapore
Sweden
Thailand
Taiwan
United States
South Africa
Total

Country Code
AUS
BRA
CAN
CHE
CHL
DEU
DNK
FRA
GBR
HKG
IDN
JPN
KOR
MEX
MYS
NLD
PHL
SGP
SWE
THA
TWN
USA
ZAF

Frequency
632
123
4,484
124
46
252
30
21
5,155
292
15
9,995
114
41
470
58
31
248
115
442
280
24,942
89
47,999
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Percent (%)
1.32
0.26
9.34
0.26
0.10
0.53
0.06
0.04
10.74
0.61
0.03
20.82
0.24
0.09
0.98
0.12
0.06
0.52
0.24
0.92
0.58
51.96
0.19
100.00

Table 2
Scores of Investor Protection across Countries
Country Name
Australia
Brazil
Canada
Switzerland
Chile
Germany
Denmark
France
United Kingdom
Hong Kong
Indonesia
Japan
Korea
Mexico
Malaysia
Netherlands
Philippines
Singapore
Sweden
Thailand
Taiwan
United States
South Africa

Country Code
AUS
BRA
CAN
CHE
CHL
DEU
DNK
FRA
GBR
HKG
IDN
JPN
KOR
MEX
MYS
NLD
PHL
SGP
SWE
THA
TWN
USA
ZAF

Investor Protection
9.51
6.13
9.75
10.00
6.52
9.05
10.00
8.68
9.22
8.91
2.88
9.17
5.55
5.37
7.72
10.00
3.47
8.93
10.00
4.89
7.37
9.54
6.45

Investor protection is measured by legal enforcement scores, i.e., the average of three measures from La
Porta et al. (1998): (1) the efficiency of the judicial system, (2) the rule of law, and (3) level of corruption
in a country (Leuz et al. 2003).
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations
Panel A. Descriptive statistics
Variable
N
EM
47,999
ANALYST
47,999
MB
47,999
SIZE
47,999
LEV
47,999
LOSS
47,999

Mean
1.190
8.714
2.489
6.445
0.161
0.203

Median
0.578
6.000
1.673
6.319
0.128
0.000

Panel B. Pearson correlations (N = 47,999)
Variable
ANALYST
MB
INVP
-0.059***
-0.023***
ANALYST
0.304***
MB
SIZE
LEV

SIZE
-0.023***
0.663***
0.136***

Std
2.563
8.360
3.194
1.693
0.160
0.403

Q1
0.317
2.000
1.049
5.248
0.017
0.000

LEV
-0.021***
0.092***
-0.014***
0.266***

Q3
0.939
12.000
2.727
7.538
0.255
0.000

LOSS
0.022***
-0.136***
-0.029***
-0.147***
0.072***

EM = Earnings management, measured as the ratio of the absolute value of accruals to the absolute
value of cash flow from operations,
ANALYST = Analyst coverage, measured as the total number of analysts who issue forecasts of the next
fiscal year’s earnings per share,
MB = Market-to-book ratio, measured as the ratio of the market value of common equity to the book
value of common equity,
SIZE = Firm size, measured as the logarithm value of total assets,
LEV = Financial leverage, measured as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets,
LOSS = Loss-making dummy, coded “1” if a firm is making loss and “0” otherwise.
In panel B, EM, ANALYST, MB, SIZE, and LEV are the fractional ranking of its continuous values within a
country-industry-year.
*** indicates a significance at the 1% level (two-tailed tests).
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Table 4
Effect of Investor Protection on Governance Role of Analyst Coverage
Variable
Intercept
INVP
ANALYST
INVP*ANALYST
MB
SIZE
LEV
LOSS

Predicted sign
+/+/+/+/+
+

Coefficient
0.812
-0.034
-0.363
0.033
-0.135
0.045
0.149
0.162

N
F-statistic
Adj. R2

t-statistic
17.51***
-6.89***
-5.25***
4.47***
-29.54***
7.42***
30.77***
51.18***
47,999
783.41***
10.24%

The regression model is as follows:
EM = b0 + b1INVP + b2ANALYST + b3INVP * ANALYST + b4MB + b5SIZE + b6 LEV + b7LOSS + ε
*** indicates a significance at the 1% level (two-tailed tests).
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(1)

Table 5
Results after Allowing for Endogeneity
Variable
Intercept
INVP
ANALYST^
INVP*ANALYST^
MB
SIZE
LEV
LOSS

Predicted sign
+/+/+/+/+
+

Coefficient
0.705
-0.024
-0.150
0.020
-0.146
-0.020
0.158
0.162

N
F-statistic
Adj. R2

t-statistic
17.24***
-5.49***
-2.30**
2.86***
-33.28***
-1.14
29.03***
51.09***
47,999
771.14***
10.10%

The first stage model is as follows:
ANALYST = a0 + a1LMIND + a2 MB + a3SIZE +a4LEV +a5LOSS + ε
(2)
where LMIND is local market index dummy, coded “1” for a firm included in a local market index and “0”
otherwise.
The second stage model is as follows:
EM = b0 + b1INVP + b2ANALYST^ + b3INVP * ANALYST^ + b4MB + b5SIZE + b6 LEV + b7LOSS + ε (1’)
where ANALYST^ is the fractional ranking of the fitted value from eq. (2) within each country-industryyear.
*** indicates a significance at the 1% level (two-tailed tests).
** indicates a significance at the 5% level (two-tailed tests).
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Table 6
Results on Alternative Proxies for Investor Protection

Variable
Intercept
INVP
ANALYST
INVP*ANALYST
MB
SIZE
LEV
LOSS
N
F-statistic
Adj. R2

Predicted sign
+/+/+/+/+
+

Anti-director rights
Coefficient
t-statistic
0.648
27.62***
-0.032
-6.68***
-0.195
-5.47***
0.029
3.92***
-0.134
-29.42***
0.047
7.75***
0.149
30.83***
0.162
51.25***

Legal origin
Coefficient
t-statistic
0.530
65.46***
-0.044
-5.29***
-0.107
-8.44***
0.062
4.87***
-0.133
-29.16***
0.047
7.69***
0.149
30.88***
0.162
51.10***

Institutional cluster
Coefficient
t-statistic
0.627
30.59***
-0.048
-6.68***
-0.227
-7.28***
0.061
5.60***
-0.133
-29.18***
0.048
7.82***
0.149
30.84***
0.162
51.13***

47,999
784.23***
10.25%

47,999
776.82***
10.16%

47,999
779.86***
10.20%

The regression model is as follows:
EM = b0 + b1INVP + b2ANALYST + b3INVP * ANALYST + b4MB + b5SIZE + b6 LEV + b7LOSS + ε
where INVP is replaced with anti-director rights, legal origin, and institutional cluster, respectively.
*** indicates a significance at the 1% level (two-tailed tests).
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(1’’)

Table 7
Results on Earnings Benchmark
Variable
Intercept
INVP
ANALYST
INVP*ANALYST
MB
SIZE
LEV
LOSS

Predicted sign
+/+/+/+/+
-

Coefficient
-0.274
-0.066
-1.022
0.101
-0.248
0.642
0.123
-1.906

N
LR statistic
-2 Log L

Chi-square
0.53
2.72*
3.38*
2.92*
42.67***
165.42***
9.61***
2,200.82***
50,023
3,965.11***
56,148.91

The logistical regression model is as follows:
EM = b0 + b1INVP + b2ANALYST + b3INVP * ANALYST + b4MB + b5SIZE + b6 LEV + b7LOSS + ε (1’’’)
where EM is measured by earnings benchmark dummy that takes the value of “1” if the change in earnings
scaled by the beginning total assets lies in the interval of [0, 002) and “0” otherwise.
*** indicates a significance at the 1% level (two-tailed tests).
* indicates a significance at the 10% level (two-tailed tests).
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